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CASE COMMENTS

BROADCAST MEDIA REGULATION: DEATH KNELL OF THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC,

F.2d

(D.C. Cir. 1974)

On September 12, 1972, the television network of the National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) aired a documentary entitled "Pensions: The Broken
Promise." Shortly after the presentation, Accuracy in Media (AIM)1 filed a
complaint with the Federal Communications Commission charging that the
program was a biased examination of private pension plans and thus violated
2
NBC's duty to present both viewpoints on issues of public importance. Upholding the decision of its Broadcast Bureau, the Commission advised NBC
that the program violated the fairness doctrine.3 On petition for review,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and HELD, unless
a broadcast licensee has departed from underlying assumptions of good- faith
and reasonable judgment in the exercise of its editorial discretion, the fairness
doctrine does not permit governmental intervention. 4
The FCC was created by Congress to allocate the limited resources of
the broadcast media through licensing and comprehensive regulatory power. 5
Judicial deference to the judgment of the FCC was established in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,6 wherein the power of the Commission
was first delineated. The Supreme Court construed the Federal Communications Act as permitting the FCC to evaluate the actual content of programming, provided it did so guided by "public interest, convenience and
necessity." 7 Thus, power of review of the federal courts would extend only
to actions of the Commission not supported by substantial evidence and to
rulings made contrary to congressionally imposed standards. 8
1. AIM is a "non-profit educational organization acting in the public interest!"
that seeks to counter what it considers biased presentations of news and public affairs.
F.2d
& n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Docket No. 73-2256) (quoting Letter of AIM to FCC,
July 2, 1973).
2.
F.2d at
3. The effective origin of the fairness doctrine stems from Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Section 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act is the
codification of the doctrine. "Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed
upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47
U.S.C. §315(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
4.
F.2d
(D.C. Cir.), vacated,
F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1974), reinstated,
F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151 (1970).
6. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
7. Id. at 227.
8. Id. at 224. The principles of judicial review of administrative decisions are codified
in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq. (1970). Petitioners must show
a legally protected right was violated, id. §702, and a federal court will be precluded from
review if the agency based its decision- on substantial evidence. Id. Cf. Complaint Concerning
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The fairness doctrine was developed to protect the rights and needs of
the public to receive representative views on issues of public concern.9 Imposed on the broadcast licensee was a "fiduciary" duty, based on the concept
that he acts as a public trustee of a limited resource.10 "Fairness" required
the broadcaster to cover issues of public importance in a way that was
adequate" and that fairly presented conflicting views.12 Because providing
broadcast time for all viewpoints would be impossible, broadcasters were given
the right to exercise editorial judgment" as long as the right of the public
to be informed remained paramount.1 4
The Supreme Court upheld governmental regulation of the broadcast
media in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,"5 based upon scarcity of available
frequencies and, secondarily, the impact of television on society.' 6 By approving the personal attack and political editorializing corollaries of the
fairness doctrine, 17 the Court affirmed the principle that limitations on the
freedom of the broadcaster were lawful' in order to enhance the public's

the CBS Program "The Selling of the Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 152 (1971) (hereinafter
cited as "Selling of the Pentagon").
9. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949).
10. The licensee is given "the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies
for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of
great public concern." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969); accord,
United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515, 517 (1945) (setting policy for balanced presentation
of controversial issues). See also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §309(h) (1970).
11. The Evening News Ass'n, 40 F.C.C. 441, 442 (1950) (discussion of Chrysler strike
was of public importance and thus improperly omitted).
12. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 556, 557 (1963) (licensee failed to consult
Negro leaders in the community in the preparation of news concerning violence attending
the enrollment of James Meredith at the University of Mississippi); New Broadcasting Co.,
40 F.C.C. 439 (1960) (broadcaster failed to present conflicting views regarding the establishment of a National Employment Practices Commission, a controversial issue).
13. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973).
In 1941 the FCC decided that licensees could not editorialize. Mayflower Broadcasting
Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1941). Eight years later the FCC retreated from its earlier
position, declaring that editorializing was permissible subject to a requirement of fairness.
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1253 (1949).
14. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
15. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
16. Id. at 390. The Supreme Court failed to reach the more difficult fairness questions
concerning what is a "controversial" issue and what is adequate coverage of opposing
views under such an issue. Five years earlier the FCC discussed these questions in an
attempt to provide licensees with guidelines. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance. 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); see Letter to
Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620, 621 (1964) (licensee must judge if controversial
issue involved).
17. 395 U.S. at 373-75. Under the personal attack rules a licensee must afford reply
time to one attacked in the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance. The political editorializing rule imposes a reply obligation where the licensee
endorses or opposes a candidate for political office. Id.
18. Limitations such as those imposed on the broadcaster's freedom, while constitutional, might be unacceptable when imposed on other media. The Court stated that although
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a first amendment interest, differences in
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right to be informed through a public right of access to the media.19 The
Red Lion Court cautioned, however, that its judgment might differ if the
20
administration of the rules had the effect of reducing news coverage.
Four years later, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee,21 the Court reaffirmed the principle that scarcity of
broadcast frequencies dictated different treatment for broadcast media than
for other modes of expression, but observed that not all regulation can be
justified in the name of scarcity. 22 Strict application of rules like the fairness
doctrine could lead to "erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in
the coverage of public issues." 23 Although the Court upheld the Commission's
regulatory system, it expressed discontent with a strict application of the
fairness doctrine2 4 and reemphasized that the editorial discretion of the licensee
2
is inviolable if exercised reasonably and in good faith. 5
A broadcast licensee faces a serious dilemma in differentiating among the
various shades of controversial and public interest issues. In any ruling regarding the controversial nature of a given issue, the FCC refers to the
general language contained in its "fairness primer," 26 which merely provides
that primary responsibility rests with the licensee and that Commission review
extends only to the good faith and reasonableness of the licensee's determination.27 Beyond this amorphous guideline, no standards have been set
for determining controversy and public importance; nor are there established
standards by which the Commission can judge the reasonableness of a licensee's
decision.
The instant case continued the judicial endeavor to maintain a balance
between the broadcaster's freedom and the public's right to know,2s and

this new medium justified differences in the first amendment standards applied to it. Id.
at 386. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19. See generally Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TExAs L. REv.
766 (1970); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
20. 395 U.S. at 393. The Court also stated that, in approving the personal attack and
political editorializing rules, it did not "approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine ...
Id. at 396.

21. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
22. Id. at 124. Total reliance on scarcity arguments may be weakened because of
technological developments in the area of cable television and UHF. See generally Note,
Cable Television Option for Florida:Plan or Chaos?, 26 U. FLA. L. Rrv. 2386 (1974).
23. 412 US. at 124.
24. Id. at 102-03, 110-11. See generally Note, Right of Access to Broadcasting: The
Supreme Court Takes a Dim View, 62 GEo. L.J. 355 (1973).
25. 412 U.S. at 127. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). See also San Francisco Women
for Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
26. 40 F.C.C. at 598; see The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
27.' Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
28.
F.2d at
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reaffirmed the wide editorial discretion available under the fairness doctrine.29
The court asserted that where an FCC ruling is challenged on the ground
that it displaces the judgment of the broadcast journalist, the court will
strictly scrutinize the ruling ° Unless there is substantial evidence of the
broadcaster's unreasonableness and bad faith, the exercise of its wide discretion must be respected even though the agency might reach a different conclusion 31 concerning whether a controversial issue of public importance was
involved. 2 Therefore, the FCC's function is to correct abuses of broadcaster
discretion while the reviewing court's role is to correct abuses of agency
discretion.
In

33

order to protect the broadcaster's first amendment rights, 3 4 the instant

court imposed a substantial burden of proof on agency findings of abuse of
journalistic discretion3 In the absence of proof of bad faith a licensee's deter3
mination that the issues presented in a program are not controversial 6 must
stand unless the Commission establishes that reasonable men viewing the
program would not have concluded that its subject was as described by the
licensee.3 - Because a finding of a controversial issue of public importance is

29. 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973). See text accompanying note 2 supra. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo the Supreme Court held that editing-the selection and choice
of material- should be the responsibility of those whose mission it is to inform, not the
responsibility of those who control. The Court also indicated that governmental control of
editing is not consistent with the first amendment guarantee of a free press. 418 U.S. 241
(1974).
. Even the Supreme Court, in Red Lion, was careful to say that it
30.
F.2d at
would be alert to extend its scope of review upon an "appropriate showing" to avoid
inhibition of robust, wide-open debate. 395 U.S. at 393; see note 8 supra.
; see Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards: Fairness
31.
F.2d at
Report Regarding Handling of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1974), in which the
FCC gives its present views on the fairness doctrine, providing: "[I]f a licensee's determination is reasonable and arrived at in good faith . . . we will not disturb it." Id. at 26,376.
While the Supreme Court's recent opinions in other areas do not, according to the instant
court, undercut the FCC's role in the fairness doctrine, the underlying principles indicate
the need for confining that role. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346
(1974) (referring to the difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide which
publications address issues of public importance and which do not); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
32. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
33.
F.2d at
. The court's function is that of "assuring that agencies respect
legislative mandates . . . to make certain that the Commission has not interpolated its
own judgment and wrested the primary discretion Congress has placed in the licensee."
Id. at 000. Generally, this court's scope of review of agency decisions is more limited. 5
U.S.C. § §701 et seq. (1970).
34. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
35.
F.2d at
36. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
37.
F.2d at
. It has even been argued that the Commission should be required
to sustain a burden of proof comparable to the standard voiced in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requiring a showing of "malice," which is defined as
either bad faith or "reckless disregard" of fairness obligations. H. GELLER, THE FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING:

PROBLEM

AND

SUGGEsrED COURSES OF ACTION

(The Rand Corp.,

R-1412-FF, Dec. 1973). But see American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co.,
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not governed by specific guidelines,3 such an evaluation must be based on
a composite editorial and communications judgment concerning the nature
9
of the program and its perception by viewers.3 Thus, extrinsic evidence4o
supportive of the broadcaster's judgment as to the dominant impact of a
presentation should be examined.' Unless the broadcaster abuses his privilege
of initial discretion, under a reasonable man standard, the Commission cannot
justifiably render a conclusion of unreasonableness. 42 Moreover, a finding of
bad faith can be sustained only by substantial evidence because a broadcaster's
right to exercise editorial judgment regarding fair presentation of issues of
public interest is suffused with first amendment protection and is based on a
congressional determination that vesting a wide degree of journalistic dis43
cretion in the broadcaster furthers the public interest.
Concern for the vitality of investigative reporting was a strong underlying
basis for the instant court's support of wide latitude in broadcast editorializing. 44 The court recognized that investigative reporting inherently involves
subject matter discretion. 45 To require a strict balancing of material supporting varying viewpoints under the guise of the fairness doctrine would unduly
burden investigative reporting, discourage the reporter's role in exposing
abuses,40 and lessen the impact of investigative reporting on the viewing
public.47
Continuing its analysis of fairness requirements in the area of investigative
journalism, the instant court considered the importance of distinguishing
between what is newsworthy and what constitutes a controversial public
issue. 48 Where a broadcaster limits his presentation to undisputed facts re43 U.S.L.W. 2009 (Ind. App., June 12, 1974) (television documentary was shown to involve "maliciousness," knowing disregard of truth or falsity, and known falsity, thereby
meeting the Sullivan test; injunction to restrain its presentation was overruled on first
amendment grounds).
38.
F.2d at
. See generally Barron, The Federal Communication Commission's
Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 1, 37 (1961) (criticism of the

fairness doctrine for failure to provide broadcasters with adequate guidelines relating to
their actual obligations). Id. at 37; Note, Fairness Doctrine: Personal Attacks and Public

Controversies, 56 GEo. L.J. 547 (1968).
39.
F.2d at
40. Id. at

41. Id. at

.

See text accompanying note 8 supra.

42. Id. at

43. It is interesting to note that, in a caveat to a 1959 amendment to §315(a) of the
Federal Communications Act, Congress declared its intention to reexamine the amendment
periodically to ascertain whether it has proved to be effective and practicable. Act of
F.2d at
Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, §2(a), 73 Stat. 557. See also
44.
F.2d at
45. Id. at
. The FCC stated in its complaint concerning "Selling of the Pentagon"
that it would be "unwise and impossible to lay down precise lines of factual accuracy
across which the broadcaster must not stray." 30 F.C.C.2d at 152.
46.
F.2d at
47. Id. at
48. Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917, 923 (1972). See generally Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C.
598, 610 (1964).
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garding existing abuses and does not treat them as a general indictment of
the area explored, 49 such reporting is considered to be of public interest, but
not controversial. The licensee does not incur a balancing obligation merely
because the facts presented jar the viewer, causing him to consider the
seriousness of the problem reported. 50 Similarly, the fairness doctrine cannot
be used by a government agency as an excuse for making its own determination
that the subject and critical thrust of a program are of sufficiently general
interest to be considered "controversial," thus requiring presentation of an
opposing viewpoint.51 Upholding the Commission's charge of unreasonableness, according to the present court, would imply that the judgment of the
Commission could be substituted for that of the broadcaster with respect to
the scope of the program.52
The fairness doctrine requires a demonstrated imbalance on controversial
issues before a program may be condemned as biased. The FCC, the coui t
stressed, attempted to show imbalance through recourse to subjective factors
regarding over-all impact

3

instead of through an objective standard of reason-

54
ableness based on substantial, documented evidence.
Although the court decided to vacate the FCC's order on the basis of the
Commission's misapplication of the fairness doctrine rather than upon a first
amendment violation, 55 it emphasized that the protections of the first amend6
ment act as a restriction on excessive governmental regulation.A
The court
asserted that the first amendment rights of the broadcaster can best be served
by minimal controls that will, in turn, insure robust and uninhibited debate
and thus broaden content. 57 Consistent with the first amendment, the fairness
doctrine can be invoked to prevent an assertion by a broadcaster of a first
amendment freedom that impairs the public's right to know. 8 But under the
guise of the fairness doctrine the FCC cannot second-guess or supersede the
primary discretion and responsibility given the broadcast journalist, absent
documentation of unreasonableness. 9

49.
F.2d at
50. Id. at
. Note that the court found that the program dealt with the broad
subject of pensions and not merely with abuses within the area.

51. Id. at
52. Id. at
53. Id. at
. To sustain an allegation of unreasonableness, the FCC must have
54. Id. at
extrinsic evidence or documents that on their face reflect deliberate distortion. "Selling of
the Pentagon," supra note 8, at 152. The instant court included television reviews in an
appendix.
F.2d at
55.
F.2d at
. See generally Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
56.
F.2d at
. Contra, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. at 114-21.
F.2d at
. The FCC has said that any presumption regarding fairness
57.
would be inconsistent with the first amendment and the profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues must be " 'uninhibited, robust, [and] wideopen.' " 30 F.C.C.2d at 152, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
58.
F.2d at
59. Id. at
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The court has not explicitly rejected the fairness doctrine but has considerably lessened its force by limiting its application." Rejecting the premise
that a broadcaster's news judgment can be attacked under the fairness doctrine,61 the court has correctly affirmed the principle that the first amendment
right of the broadcaster to exercise his discretion regarding issues presented
will be upheld without a documented showing of bad faith and unreasonableness.62 Broadcast media regulations have been rationalized as protecting the
right of the public to be informed. When these regulations unnecessarily
hamper the licensee's first amendment rights so that the vitality of investigative
reporting becomes endangered, however, the court has held that it must
intervene.6 3 The instant court has attempted to strike the delicate balance
between the first amendment rights of the media and the right of the people
to know. Its decision has been based on a clear objective standard for
examining abuse of editorial discretion as well as on the reasoning that
substitution of the FCC's judgment for that of the broadcaster would involve
impermissible interference with a constitutionally protected right. As suggested by the majority opinion, the instant decision may actually enhance
the right of the public to be informed by insuring the journalistic discretion
vital to informing the American citizenry of societal evils.64
The dissent noted, however, that the paramount right of the public might
be in jeopardy65 if the fairness doctrine has, through the instant decision,
lost its effectiveness as a safeguard against biased investigative reporting
except in the nfost extreme cases of abuse of journalistic discretion. That the
broadcaster has been vested with infallibility is a possibility,60 since it is
questionable if the FCC can ever sustain an allegation of unreasonableness
under the strict standards imposed by the instant court. It is hoped that
this decision, as a major blow against government-controlled news, will not
result in abuse of discretion by the broadcast journalist but will serve to
"liberat[e] the questioning mind and spirit."67
J. DIANE EvwuTr

60. The instant holding could be narrowly construed as referring only to documentaries.
61.

See Comment, The Fairness Doctrine: Time for the Graveyard?, 2 FoRDHAM URBAN

L.J. 563 (1974).
62. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
63.
F.2d at
64.
F.2d at
. But see Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Re65. Id. at
flections on Fairness and Access, 85 HAsv. L. Rav. 768 (1972) (arguing that inasmuch as
broadcasting has only a marginal impact on the public's political consciousness and because an extension of the fairness doctrine may exact significant costs in terms of other
important values, the logic of recent decisions should be carefully limited). It is interesting
to note that Judge Tamm, the sole dissenter in the instant case, wrote -the majority
opinions in several cases upon which the instant court relied. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aft'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
F.2d at
66.
67. Id. at
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